Input, Output and Who Does It
Both organizations bring their actual assurance requirements, evidence they can lawfully share and delegated decision routes. Produce a reciprocal working record: assurance question, proposed evidence, privacy limit, reviewer and unresolved decision. It does not clear sanctions, waive mandatory requirements or approve a partner.
Steps
- From each side's actual requirement, state the assurance question. Output: a precise question and its source, rather than a preferred document treated as the purpose.
- From permitted evidence options, discuss acceptable alternatives against that requirement. Output: a proposed evidence/evaluation route; missing evidence remains a gap.
- From actual access/privacy rules, set the minimum needed information and restricted viewing. Output: an explicit limit and approved location, not unrestricted circulation.
- From each delegation, name who reviews evidence and who decides. Output: separate reviewer/decision roles with authority confirmation still pending where absent.
- From unresolved issues, record the decision needed, responsible owner and follow-up. Output: a visible conditional status; no automatic acceptance or exclusion.
These steps establish the process; they do not prescribe assurance sufficiency or replace the actual requirement.
Fictional Worked Record
Every organization, trail and bank letter here is invented. The proposed funding is three installments of 4,000 USD:3 x 4,000 =12,000 USD, without transfer approval or proven future liquidity.
| Side/question | Proposed evidence | Limit/reviewer | Unresolved decision |
|---|---|---|---|
| HLN: can KCT approve/check purchases before payment? | Current ledger and five redacted purchase trails from twenty purchases | No staff pay/personal addresses; named restricted reviewer | Actual requirement and whether this evidence suffices need the authorized owner's decision |
| KCT: can HLN fund installments on time? | Bank-issued letter stating funds available, not full statements | Named restricted reviewer; letter scope/date checked | Letter alone cannot guarantee future liquidity or all installments' affordability |
| HLN identity/status requirement | Named-registry certificate absent; local renewal receipt held | Authorized identity/status reviewer checks actual requirement | UNRESOLVED; receipt is not confirmed registration or a completed renewal |
Five of twenty is 5 /20 =25%. That fictional fraction illustrates the supplied packet; it is neither a recommended sample nor an assurance conclusion. This financial-controls evidence example teaches no recipient-result measurement.
Exception: Missing Certificate
The checklist's named certificate is absent. Do not automatically label KCT accepted, ineligible or registered from the receipt. Establish the actual applicable identity/status requirement, allowed evidence and decision authority. If a mandatory requirement applies, a reviewer cannot waive it. A conditional proceeding option can be considered only by the genuinely delegated owner where the actual rules permit it; director or treasurer titles alone confer no power.
Human Boundary and Links
Each side's actual delegated owner decides its assurance questions; reviewers state what their evidence does and does not show. Confirm independent contact-route integrity/currentness before relying on important email claims; another channel alone proves neither authorship nor authority. Unresolved provenance stays unresolved.
In real human review, use necessary permitted evidence in approved restricted systems. Never send actual bank letters, purchase trails, personal or confidential records to external AI. Use only fictional/public non-sensitive inputs there. The due-diligence checklist records wider questions; this procedure retains two-way assurance rather than copying its fields.
Sources and Scope
Tool 8/Tool 10 (January 3, 2011), CC 34 (March 7, 2024) and decision guidance (November 2, 2020) inform partner questions, responsibilities and authority in England/Wales. NCSC New Zealand's January 14, 2026 AI overview identifies privacy/reliability risks; its detailed linked PDF was not read. UK NCSC phishing guidance (reviewed February 13, 2024) informs communication caution, without trust guarantees. Reciprocal evidence design is OpenAid practice, not universal approval law. Checked November 1, 2026.